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Introduction
It is widely accepted that the current accelerated processes of concentration in the food 
sector could negatively affect the resource allocation, on both sides of equity and efficiency. 
Several issues are at stake: 1-the consumers’ losses due to the exercise of market power at the 
final stage of the marketing channel; 2- the unequal distribution of the value added among 
actors in the food chain endowed with different degrees of buying and market power; 3- the 
general efficiency loss associated with monopolistic situations; 4- the exploitation of rural and 
environmental resources in developing countries carried out by multinational firms; 5- the 
difficulties of projecting and testing effective policies in a sector widely affected by market 
imperfections. 
During the last two decades a good deal of theoretical and empirical literature have tried 
to model and estimate market power in the food sector, especially with the aim of supporting 
and guiding antitrust legislation. This literature has mainly been based on models of imperfect 
competition offered by the standard economic theory (Sheldon, Sperling, 2001). Only a few 
studies (Magdoff et al., 2000; Goodman, Watts, 1997) have tried to use non-orthodox 
approaches to explain the ways in which the occurring concentration and centralization of 
capital in the food sector could affect national economies and societies well beyond the 
general accounted “market power effects”. 
In this paper I stress that in order to understand the current restructuring processes in the 
food system it is necessary to take explicitly into account the role of power as a driving 
organizational force in the system. 
In the first section, I introduce the concept of power, confronting some different 
definitions of power from different realms of social science. Section 2 surveys economic 
literature on power, stemming from the view of the standard model to the newest theories 
developed by the new institutional economics and to power definition and concepts suggested 
by different strands of social network analysis. Section 3 uses different concepts of power to 
address some organizational problems in the food system. 
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1. Power definitions 
 
1.1 A power definition: power as a relational behaviour 
 
A great deal of social and political literature has attempted to give accurate definitions of 
power and it would be a challenging task to even give only a taste of it. Some classical 
monographs (Lukes, 1986, 2005; Popitz, 1986; Cregg, 1989) offer a wide survey of the issue. 
My aim in this section is to sketch a short “systematic of power” limiting the attention to 
those definitions of power that better fit the economics of the food system.   
Russel (1986) defines power as the production of intended effects, that is the capability of 
somebody of achieving her own interest. This definition is a wide one and states the first 
attribute of a workable concept of power: the behavioural attribute. 
Power is mainly a behaviour, involving a rational human being, who acts to pursue some 
aim. That which gives the actors the possibility of deciding (defining goals and means) and 
acting (actually performing their task) is their endowment of material and immaterial assets. 
The magnitude of this endowment also determines the degree to which the actor is able to 
achieve his desires (that is the success of his behaviour). In this general form power can be 
labelled “power to act” (Palermo, 2000), or “power to do” (Holloway, 2002). 
In order to achieve her aims the actor can also command somebody else to do something 
and/or control the behaviour of somebody. In this case the power to do something somehow 
implies the power over somebody. Accordingly, power is defined in a relationship, and 
becomes a strategic behaviour (this means that the behaviour of one actor takes into account 
the behaviour of other actors; in other words the choice domains of two or more actors are in 
someway overlapped). The relational dimension of power is underlined by the well-known 
definition by Dhal, thoroughly quoted in the literature on power: “At the most general level, 
power terms in modern social science refer to subsets of relations among social units such that 
the behaviours of one or more units (the responsive units, R) depend in some circumstances 
on the behaviour of other units (the controlling units, C)” (Dhal, 1986). 
The difference between the two power characterizations is more visible when using 
languages such as Italian, French and German where the nouns potere, pouvoir and macht 
have both the meanings of can and command-control (the German noun macht has also the 
explicit meaning of doing). To underline this point it is useful a quotation from Holloway 
(2002, p.29): “power, in the first place, is simply that: can-nes, capacity-to-do, the ability to 
do things”. Borders between the two power characterizations, power-to-do and power-over, 
tend to vanish if we assume that the actors’ behavior is social before it is individual (therefore 
rejecting the methodological individualism which the standard model is based on). As 
Holloway claims: 
«Power-to-do is never individual: it is always social.......Doing (and power-to-do) is 
always part of a social flow, but that flow is constituted in different ways. It is when the social 
flow of doing is fractured that power-to is transformed into its opposite, power-over. The 
social flow is fractured when doing itself is broken. Doing –as-a-projecton-byond is broken 
when some people arrogate to themselves the projecton-beyond (conception) of the doing and 
command others to execute what they have conceived. Doing is broken as the ‘powerful’ 
conceive but do not execute, while the others execute but do not conceive.»  
The difference between these two power characterizations, power to act and power over, 
is the first step in my power systematic, as illustrated in figure 1. Power to do refers to the 
“brigth” side of the concept, i.e. power as possibilities (can-ness), freedom, opportunities. 
Power-over refers to the “dark side” of the concept, i.e. power as control, command, coercion. 
The second step in my power systematic is the characterization of power-over stemming 
from the very famous weberian definitions of power. 
 3
Weber defines generically power (macht) as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the 
basis on which this probability rests.” (this sentence, taken from the English edition of 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, is quoted in Dhal, 1986). 
Besides this primary form of power, that indicates a relationship de facto, regardless of its 
legitimacy (Ferrarotti, 2004), Weber dedicates his analytical effort to the legitimate power 
(Herrschaft), i.e. to that power which identifies a legitimate relationship of subordination. The 
latter takes three ideal forms: 1) bureaucracy, when legitimacy lies in the legal system; 2) the 
traditional power, when legitimacy lies in culture and tradition, that is in those informal 
contracts (common values, conventions) that integrate societies besides the state; 3) 
charismatic power, when legitimacy lies in the peculiar characteristics of the leader that make 
the subordinates ‘instinctively’ be willing to obey. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The weberian definitions of power (see figure 1) are consistent with the basic definition of 
power as a relationship (power-over). The absolute form of power (macht) does not need 
legitimacy to be exercised and includes the extreme form of coercive power, violence. The 
legitimate power (herrschaft) is based on consensus obtained through a formal contract 
(bureaucracy), or by an informal contract (traditional power) or by faith. These definitions are 
useful to restrict the analysis of power to those kinds of power that assume the form of a 
rational behaviour in a given institutional constraint. In this way it is not taken explicitly into 
account the problem of the role of power in determining a specific institutional framework 
(i.e. the problem of the genesis of the constitutions), and the kind of power linked to non-
rational behaviours (where a rational behaviour is defined as a purposive behaviour, i.e. a 
behaviour guided by goals known with awareness by the actors). Power-over legitimated 
Figure 1 General power definitions.  
Power
Power to act 
(freedom, 
opportunuties)
Power over 
(command, control)
Weberian definitions 
Macht 
(legitimacy is not required)  Herrschaft 
(legitimate power) 
 Bureaucracy 
(legitimated by the 
legal system) 
Traditional 
(legitimated by 
social norms) 
Charismatic 
(legitimated by 
‘irrational’ collective 
behaviors) 
Legitimate Power as a 
rational relational 
behavior 
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through contracts, either formal or informal, can be referred to as “legitimate power as 
rational relational behaviour”, as reported in the last raw of figure 1. In its relational 
dimension power can be viewed as an actors’ behaviour (determining the structure of the 
relationship) or as a type of structure of the relationship (determining the actors’ behaviour). 
The first view is baked by social theories based on the assumption of methodological 
individualism (basically all approaches that make a wide use of the theory of rational choice), 
while the second view is baked by those theories based on the assumption of methodological 
collectivism (Archer, 1995) (basically functionalism and structuralism, but someway also the 
theory of conflict). Both approaches are essential for a full understanding of the power 
phenomenon.  
To better delimit and understand the power definition given so far, ‘legitimate power as a 
rational relational behavior’ (see figure 1) it is worth remembering the analysis of power 
made by Coleman (1999) and that made by Crozier and Friedberg (1977).  
 
1.2. Coleman’s concepts of authority and power 
 
The social theory of Coleman (Coleman, 1990) is basically an individual-level theory of 
action, which assumes social actors to be self-interested purposive responsible individuals. 
Coleman’s social theory seeks to explain the behavior of a social system by means of three 
components: “the effects of properties of the system on the constraints or orientations of 
actors; the actions of actors who are within the system; and the combination or interaction of 
those actions, bringing about the systemic behavior.” (Coleman, 1990, p. 27).  
According to Coleman, society, both at the micro and macro level (considering also the 
connections between the two levels), can be understood stemming from a theory of rational 
choice, built on four elementary ingredients: actors and resources, as the two basic elements, 
and interest and control, as the two ways in which these elements are related. Resources are 
those material and immaterial assets in which actors have interest and over which they have a 
certain degree of control. It is assumed that the goal of the actors is to maximise their 
realization of interests (their utility). When each actor has control over resources she is 
interested in, society is merely a sum of separate individuals and its study is trivial. On the 
contrary, as Coleman states (Coleman, 1990, p.29): 
«What makes a social system is a simple structural fact: actors are not fully in control 
over activities that can satisfy their interest, but find some of those activities partially or 
wholly under control of other actors. Thus pursuit of one’s interest in such a structure 
necessarily requires that one engage in transactions of some type with other actors.» It is 
interesting to noticing that in this respect the theory of Coleman is very close to the 
“classical” theories of social exchange previously conceived by Blau (1964) and Homans 
(1958). 
In the Coleman’s construction actors are conceived as rational utility maximizing 
individuals, and resources are conceived as rights. Taking for granted the existence of a legal 
system of property rights, Coleman notes that when exchanging a resource what really is 
exchanged are the rights to exercise a certain degree of control over the resource. It is worth 
noticing that this idea, -that what is exchanged is not the good, but a right to carry out actions 
involving somehow the good-, is not useful in the case of the typical economic goods of the 
standard economic model (i.e. goods that are private, divisible, alienable and with no 
externality). 
Among those resources over which individuals have control are their own actions, and 
therefore among rights foreseen by the legal system are individuals’ rights of control over 
their actions and rights of transfer these rights. Stemming from this consideration, Coleman 
defines authority as the right to control another’s actions (Coleman, 1990, p.66). An authority 
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relation occurs when individuals give up the right to control certain of their actions, because 
either they are under threat or promise, or they see it as in their best interest to do so. In other 
terms, an authority relation of one actor over another exists when the first has rights of control 
over certain actions of the other. Coleman distinguishes between involuntary and voluntary 
authority relations. 
Involuntary authority relations occur when the right to control the action and the right to 
transfer that right, are not held by the actor, but by someone else. In the involuntary case there 
is no consensus among the parties involved in the relation, the subordinate and the 
superordinate. When the consensus is not even external to the relation, involuntary relation is 
a form of illegitimate power, as in the extreme case of violence. When there is an external 
consensus, involuntary relation is in any case a legitimate form of power. The external 
consensus can be embodied in the legal system (for example when constitutionally individuals 
have different civil and political rights, as in the case of children and women) or can be 
embodied in social norms (in this case the kind of legitimacy is the same as in the Weber’s 
traditional power).  
In the case of voluntary authority relations, rights of control and the right to transfer those 
rights are held by the actor (the subordinate) who voluntary vests authority in the other party 
(the superordinate) of the relationship. Therefore it is a consensual relation. Coleman 
considers two broad classes of voluntary relations: 1- conjoint authority relations, where “one 
actor vests authority in another because the first actor believes that he will be better off by 
following the other’s leadership” (Coleman, 1990, p.72); 2- disjoint authority relations when 
“the actor transfers rights of control without holding this belief, but in return for some 
extrinsic compensation” (Coleman, 1990, p.72).  
Examples of conjoint relations can be found in associative organization based on 
collaborative behavior and partially sustained by trust, such as trade unions, communes, and 
to some extent cooperatives. Examples of disjoint relationship are employment relations and 
broadly speaking all principal-agent relationships in bureaucratic organizations.  
Finally it must be underlined that the definition of authority and power given by Coleman 
are complete and operationally effective, both on the theoretical and empirical ground, only 
considering the legal system (i.e the State, i.e. the constitution) as given, as a variable external 
to the model. Therefore Coleman’s theory does not give solution to the basic “political and 
moral” organizational problem of societies, namely how to define, distribute and enforce 
property rights, that is the basic constitutional problem. 
So far the definition of power given by Coleman, in term of authority is quite equivalent 
to the definition of Herrschaft given by Weber, unless for the unvoluntary non-consensual 
case that is closer (but does not completely cover) to the weberian concept of macht. 
Nevertheless, Coleman also explicitly introduces the term power. In the chapter dedicated to 
rights (it is good to remember that in the Coleman’s construction all resources involved in 
social exchange can be ultimately considered as rights) Coleman points out that to make 
social exchange begin it is necessary that actors hold the rights involved in the exchange and 
this is possible “at the pleasure of relevant others”. Relevant others are just actors at whose 
pleasure a right is held. “The general definition of relevant others is a simple one: they are 
those with the power, collectively , to enforce the right.” (Coleman, 1990, p.58). This 
definition locates the source of rights in power. Nevertheless, given that “the power itself may 
be constrained by the prior existence of other rights” (Coleman, 1990, p.58), the discourse on 
the genesis of rights (and power) becomes recursive, and definitions of power and rights 
collapse in a tautological loop.  
Somehow, Coleman addresses the classical hobbesian dilemma, i.e. that a multitude of 
human being in its “state of nature” is not able to accomplish common goals (and hence to 
promote prosperity) because the individual self-interest and the lack of coordination make 
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social interaction take the form of a paradigmatic one-shot prisoner dilemma game. Hobbes 
states that to solve this dilemma it is necessary that people abdicate the right to control their 
action, vesting authority in the Leviatano, an autocrat with absolute coercive power. This is 
intended to be the ultimate “social contract”, and social order and prosperity only can come 
from this. Hobbes fails to explain clearly how this contract can be achieved, but it is quite 
implicit in his discourse that it will be imposed on a part of society by another part simply 
through violence. Now it is clear that Coleman, in his attempt to draw a self-governing 
society shaped by actors’ rational behaviors, cannot solve the dilemma anyway, leaving blank 
the definition of power. 
 
1.3. Power in action: the role of power in formal organizations 
 
Crozier and Friedberg (1977) have examined thoroughly the role of power in formal 
organizations. They stem from the very same definition of power which has been given so far, 
a relation between rational actors. 
Somehow their investigation begins where the Coleman’s analysis ends. According to 
Coleman, exchanges of rights among actors lead to those authority relations that make the 
superordinate determine the actions of the subordinate according to the terms signed up in the 
contract. This means that the behavior of the parties is perfectly disciplined by the contracts. 
Following the Williamson’s definition (Williamson, 1985), Coleman confines his analysis at 
the ex-ante part of the contractual relationship, considering in this way only contracts that are 
perfect, complete and enforceable through an effective legal system.  
Crozier and Friedberg start with a given set of formal disjoint authority relations, as a 
bureaucracy, and show that, during the execution of contracts, parties will be engaged in 
bargaining activities (and hence new exchanges will occur) for the exploitation of those rights 
of control left out by contract’s terms. Consequently new power relations will take place, 
where the power of an actor A over an actor B is defined as the A’s capability to obtain 
favourable outcomes in the exchange relation engaged with B. Obviously when A covers the 
role of superordinate of B in the authority relation, this gives him more opportunity to 
exercise power also in other bargaining settings. Nevertheless also B can exercise power over 
A, using the “marge de liberté” (Crozier, Friedberg, 1977, p.36) left to him by the sources of 
incertitude inside the organization, which gives him the possibility of refusing to accomplish 
A’ requests.  
Crozier and Friedberg claim that besides the formal position in the hierarchy there are 
other sources of power, generally linked to those properties of the organization at high degree 
of incertitude: functional specialization, informative systems, unstable external environment, 
professional competences, resource specificity. Power of actors in the organization is due to 
their endowment of “atouts” and to the value of these atouts in the bargaining for the control 
of the incertitude (the residual rights of control); the value of these atouts will depend on the 
“pertinence” with the exchange relation and on the interest on it by other parties (Crozier, 
Friedberg, 1977, p.66-69). 
In terms of contract theory in the analysis of Crozier and Friedberg the relevant power 
relations are those emerging from the negotiating process, which occurs during the execution 
(ex-post) of incomplete long-term contracts. Therefore power relations are sustained by those 
elements, informative problems, limited rationality, opportunism, non-effective external 
enforcement system, that also limit the organizational functions of competitive markets.  
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2. Power and the economic theory 
In this section, in surveying different approaches to the study of power in economics, I 
first present approaches stemmed from the standard model that preserve hypothesis of 
methodological individualism and rational choice. Subsequently I introduce three structural 
approaches stemmed from literature on sociological economics based on the hypothesis of 
methodological collectivism. Finally, I integrate these different approaches in a general 
framework drawn on the perspective of the New Institutional Economics. 
 
2.1. Power and the standard model 
 
Methodological individualism, and the assumption of rational optimizing actors, make the 
Coleman’s social theory based on the analysis of social exchange, be a sort of mirror of the 
standard economic theory (based on the analysis of economic exchanges). Given this 
theoretical and methodological similarity, one question is pertinent: why has the analysis of 
authority relations, and of the sources of power held by actors in the relation, not been studied 
with equal emphasis in Economics? Coleman (1990) gives an exhaustive answer to this basic 
question at page 782 of his book: 
«If the system of action is a perfectly competitive market and all transactions are 
voluntary exchanges within that market, it is possible to characterize the power of each actor 
very simply......It is the amount of wealth he brings to the market, either in the form of money 
(which is the measure of wealth) or in the form of goods and services desired by others who 
have wealth (which is measured by the extent of that demand). In such an individualistic, 
voluntary, and competitive system, power is well specified and consists of nothing more or 
less than wealth. In such a system money will buy anything, and thus the amount of power an 
actor can exert in the system (that is, the degree to which he can realize the outcomes he 
desires) is merely the amount of money (or other resources measured in terms of the money 
they can be exchanged for) he holds.» 
Coleman’s statements clarify that even when we assume 1-that the political problem 
(who decides to whom rights are originally -i.e. before the exchange system starts working- 
distributed) is already solved, and 2- that there exists a complete system of perfectly 
competitive markets, even then power is present in the system. In this case power assumes 
explicitly the form of power to act, but it can also assume the form of power-over, when 
among goods being exchanged are rights limiting personal freedom or basic human rights. 
Furthermore, in the real extreme competitive case authority relations do not occur because 
they would entail long-term contract, while an ideal competitive system foresees only short-
term contracts (spot markets). In the enlarged model long-term contracts are foreseen, but in 
the form of complete contracts. In this latter case power-over indeed occurs, in the form of 
legitimate voluntary exchange relations as drawn by Coleman, while characterizations of 
power drawn by Crozier and Friedberg are excluded. 
It is a matter of fact that, according to the definitions of power given in the previous 
section, the standard model also accounts for power, nevertheless it does not explicitly 
analyse and not even name power. The reason is that orthodox economists, in their apologia 
of market economies, have stressed the “freedom-aspect” of power relations. In that way 
power to act (in the form of purchasing power) becomes freedom to act  and the exercise of 
power-over is confused with the exercise of the coordinative entrepreneurial ability.  
Mainstream economics deals explicitly with power only in the form of market power and 
bargaining power (Rothschild, 2002). Somehow, the fact that the possibility to set a price 
exceeding the competitive one is named market power, witnesses the ideological bias of the 
orthodox economics given by the “reification” of market. Market economies, and liberal 
societies based on market economies, are seen as perfectly democratic because the market (a 
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sort if divine entity) is deemed to allocate resource in an otherwise acephalic system (the 
result is a sort of magically ordered anarchy where there is no reason for raising the classical 
“hobbesian worries”). In this view actors who take the place of the market are said to have 
power, the power to take decisions that involve other people (consumers) besides themselves. 
Also in the case of bargaining power, the power is connected to the possibility for the 
parties to make the price, with the party with more bargaining power being able to 
“command” the exchange terms to the other party. 
Market power and bargaining power are analysed as cases of market imperfection, i.e. 
cases in which the market (intended as the basic institution of capitalist economies) fails to 
perform its function of coordination. It has been the literature on market failure together with 
the modern theory of firm that have opened the way to the power issue in economics. There 
are at least two important strands of literature that directly address the issue: the contested 
exchange approach within the neo-behavioural economics; the literature on the internal 
politics of firms, within the managerial theories of the firm 
 
2.2. The contested exchange approach and the influence cost theory 
 
Through the contested exchange approach Bowles and Gintis show that in capitalist 
economies voluntary market exchange engenders a structure of power relations among 
economic agents, even when a competitive equilibrium is attained. This view contrasts with 
the assertion (generally sustained by orthodox economists) that power relations are produced 
by deviations from competitive conditions, such as the pervasiveness of monopoly, the 
autonomy of management, corporate influence over government policy and consumer 
demand, the ubiquity of disequilibrium. 
By a ‘competitive capitalist economy’ Bowles an Gintis (1999, p.14) mean “one in which 
productive assets are privately owned, production is carried out by employees, and all markets 
are characterized by free entry and large number of buyers and sellers”. In such an economy 
power relations can occur whenever contracts defining exchange’s terms are incomplete and 
the walrasian ‘exogenous enforcement assumption’ does not hold. 
Incomplete contracts give rise to competing claims, that make transactions need an 
adequate enforcement system to be viable. When a third party enforcement is not possible (for 
instance when the contested attribute can be measured only imperfectly or at considerable 
cost; typical examples are work effort, quality in case of experience and credence goods, the 
degree of risk assumed by a firm management), an endogenous enforcement system is 
required. Bowles and Gintis (1993, 1999) refer to “contested exchange” as an exchange 
setting where the benefit the parties derive from the transaction depends on their own 
capacities to enforce competing claims. The party in the relationship who exercises power is 
the one able to institute monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms by which to induce the other 
party to provide the desired level of the contested attribute. The authors take as an example an 
employment relationship where the contested resource is the work effort. In the example the 
employer (A) gets the desired effort from the employee (B) offering B a higher wage than the 
reservation wage (reservation wage equates the equilibrium wage in the Walrasian model), at 
the same time using an endogenous enforcement mechanism, called ‘contingent renewal’. A 
contingent renewal obtains when A elicits performance from B by promising to renew the 
contract in future period if satisfied, and to terminate the contract if not. The difference 
between the reservation wage and the offered wage is the enforcement rent. The existence of 
the enforcement rent allows the equilibrium wage to be higher than the reservation wage and 
consequently makes the labour market not clear in competitive equilibrium, with a part of 
workers rationed out of the market. Defining the short side of a market as the side for which 
the quantity of desired transaction is the least, it happens that “short-side agents have power 
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over the long-side agents with whom they transact, since they may at little or no cost to 
themselves impose significant sanction by terminating the contract” (Bowles and Gintis, 
1993, p.90). In this case A who can purchase any desired amount of labour (given the 
unemployment associated with en equilibrium wage higher than the reservation one) is on the 
short side of the market. On the contrary B is on the long-side. In the example long-side 
agents are of two types: “those such as B who succeed in finding an employer and receive a 
rent which constrains them to accept the employer’s authority, and those such C who fail to 
make a transaction and hence are rationed out of the market”. (Bowles, Gintis, 1999, p. 22-
23). More generally the phenomenon of short side power explains why those in authority in 
an organization may reasonably expect to be obeyed, namely because they are in a position to 
deprive the long-side counterparts of a substantial enforcement rent, even where no 
transaction-specific assets are involved. 
Business and management literature has approached the power issue with the aim to 
analyse the political dimension of firms. Political activities can be largely defined as those 
activities carried out by different members of an organization in order to influence the 
organization’s decisions in a way useful to achieve their own interests, even when the latter 
are not consistent with the goals of the organization. Political activities are carried out by 
firms by trying to influence the decisions of outside organizations in a way to reduce 
constraints (or raise opportunities) for the betterment of their own internal strategies. Political 
activities are also carried out within the firms by different members of the organization 
(owners, managers, workers, stakeholders) in order to exploit possible sources of rents. 
Literature on rent-seeking behaviour and influence cost theory (Milgrom and Roberts,1999) 
have analysed the effects of these activities on firms’ performance, and have suggested 
organizational “mechanism designs” adequate to mitigating the negative ones (such as 
distortions in decision making processes). Actors who succeed in their influence activities are 
those who exert power over the actors whose actions and decisions affect their interest. Power 
is here associated with the fact that, contrary to the prescriptions of the standard model, “the 
outcomes of firm decisions create winners and losers, where winners enjoy quasi-rents” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1999, p 47). The reference is to the general definition of rents and 
quasi rents: rents are payments beyond those required to attract a resource in an activity; 
quasi-rents are payments beyond those that a resource could expect to get by quitting the 
activity where it is engaged and entering into another activity. Therefore power can arise 
whenever firm decisions have non trivial distributional consequences. 
 
2.3. Structural approaches 
 
As structural approaches to the analysis of power I consider three theories that can be 
widely inscribed in the social network analysis literature (Wasserman, Faust, 1994): the 
power dependence theory; the theory of structural holes, and network theories inspired by the 
small world phenomenon. According to these approaches power, as other actors’ behaviors 
and characteristics, arises from the structure of the system, where structure refers to the “web” 
(with its proper scale, scope and shape) of relational ties among actors in the system. 
The concept of power featured by the power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) derives 
from exchange theory emphasis on the ties of mutual dependence that underlie all social 
structures. Social exchange theory depicts many forms of social interactions as exchanges of 
benefits. The underlying idea is that people strongly depend on one another for the different 
resources they value and they provide them to one another through the process of exchange, 
also outside the economic marketplace. To the extent that dependence is mutual, actors in 
social relations have power over each other. Moreover to the extent that their dependencies 
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are unequal, their relations are unequal, with more powerful (less dependent) actors enjoying 
greater benefits at lower costs. 
The concept of power featured by the power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) derives 
from exchange theory emphasis on the ties of mutual dependence that underlie all social 
structures. Social exchange theory depicts many forms of social interactions as exchanges of 
benefits. The underlying idea is that people strongly depend on one another for the different 
resources they value and they provide them to one another through the process of exchange, 
also outside the economic marketplace. To the extent that dependence is mutual, actors in 
social relations have power over each other. Moreover to the extent that their dependencies 
are unequal, their relations are unequal, with more powerful (less dependent) actors enjoying 
greater benefits at lower costs. 
In general terms given two resources x  and y  that are exchanged between two agents A 
and B, with yxyx ββαα ,,, , being the unit value (i.e. the utility) of the resources to A and B, 
the theory states that: “In any exchange relation ( ByAx; ) the power of A over B ( abP ) is the 
potential of A to obtain favourable Y minus X outcomes at B’s expense and is equal to the 
dependence of A upon B ( abD ), i.e. baab DP = . The dependence of A upon B ( abD ) is a joint 
function varying directly with the value of yα  minus xα , and varying inversely with the 
availability of y to A from alternative sources.” Power therefore is related to the number of 
alternative exchange possibilities available for an actor, i.e. to her exchange network 
structure.  
In spite of its very “structuralist assumption” (the web of relations matters “in primis”, 
actors’ behaviours depending on it), power-dependence theory allows for a better 
understanding of at least two important features of actors’ behaviour that affect the role of 
power in determining exchange outcomes: normative concerns and strategic use of power. 
Normative concerns are taken into account by Cook and Emerson (1978) in addressing the 
problem of indeterminacy in bilateral monopoly. Specifically they stress the role of power and 
equity, both considered as social structural phenomena, in determining the location of the 
outcome along the contract curve, this latter defined as the cluster of points of different 
distributive equilibria of the maximum outcome available from the exchange. They 
demonstrate that the equitable solution of a dyadic exchange (i.e. the equal distribution of the 
total maximum exchange value) occurs when neither party has alternative sources and when 
the behaviour is driven by normative concerns about equity (i.e. the parties will refuse any 
outcome that unequally distributes the total profit, in the same way as in the ultimatum game 
the responder will refuse low offers). When one agent has alternative sources and equity 
concerns are weak, the exchange outcome will be chosen by the agent with more power, with 
the power associated with the position of the agents in the network, i.e. with the number of 
alternative available sources. In other terms power reaches its highest “organizational 
performance” when actors actually behave like the homo economicus, while giving way to 
reciprocal norms and trust as organizational devices when homo reciprocans and homo 
egualis (in the terminology used by Gintis, 2000) enter the stage. 
The strategic use of power is dealt with by Molm (1997) in her research on coercive 
power in social exchange. Molm offers experimental and theoretical evidence that the basic 
assumptions and concepts of exchange theory can be extended to include punishment and 
coercive power, besides the traditionally assumed reward power. Stemming from this 
evidence Molm features a strategic use of power that differs from the structurally induced 
power in an important behavioural principle. Actors who use power strategically respond to 
others’ behaviours (as in the case of principle of reciprocity of the “standard” power-
dependence theory), but they also attempt to influence them. “Rather than giving rewards to 
obtain benefits in return, actors administer rewards and punishment contingently; in particular 
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they impose cost (by administering punishment or withholding rewards) on partners who fail 
to provide sufficient benefits.” (Molm, 1997, p. 161).  
Social exchange theory focuses on the analysis of singular dyadic relations taking as its 
subject matter the more or less enduring relations that form between specific partners (or in 
terms of contract theory incomplete resource-specific long term contracts). Accordingly it 
offers a structure-based solution to the classical bargaining problem of bilateral monopoly, 
leaving out the issue of structural determinants of competition, this latter specifically 
addressed by Burt’s theory of structural holes. In the introduction of his book Burt explicitly 
states that the subject of the book is “how competition works when players have established 
relations with others” (Burt, 1992, p.1), i.e. when the competitive arena is investigated as a 
network whose nodes are the players in the competition game. Network structure is 
responsible for differences in competitive advantage among the players, with structural holes, 
defined as disconnections or nonequivalencies between players, being the core structural 
element. Burt’s main argument is that players with networks rich in structural holes (and 
therefore with high structural autonomy) enjoy high rates of return on investments because 
“they know about, take part in, and exercise control over more rewarding opportunities” 
(Burt, 1992, p.2). Burt explains the competitive advantage associated with structural holes in 
terms of freedom (freedom to exploit market opportunities), explicitly excluding the power 
argument: “This is the focus of the structural hole argument, a theory of freedom instead of 
power, of negotiated instead of absolute control. It is a description of the extent to which the 
social structure of a competitive arena creates entrepreneurial opportunities for certain players 
to affect the terms of relationships.” (Burt, 1992, p. 7). With the previous definitions of power 
in mind, one can contend that Burt’s statement holds only when power is defined as 
illegitimate and/or coercive. When power is considered in the form of power to act, or, as 
power over, in the form of legitimate reward power (bargaining power is an example), then 
the competitive advantages of actors with networks rich in structural holes stem from the 
exercise of power. The asymmetry in the social capital endowment by actors and the 
structurally induced consequences of this asymmetry on their market opportunities (also in the 
form of exercising market power) and bargaining power is the very cause of high performance 
associated with structural holes. Burt fails to recognize the power source of competitive 
advantages; this for the same reason that in the standard model, the power to act of wealthier 
actors is termed freedom, whilst bargaining and market power are considered as mere results 
of market imperfections, instead of peculiar behaviour able to influence in their turn market 
structures. In a way, Burt’s denial of the power argument is even stronger than that of the 
standard model. Assuming competition as a matter of relations, and not of players’ attributes, 
he affirms that “competition is a matter of freedom, not just power; the structural hole 
argument is a theory of competition made imperfect by the freedom of individuals to be 
entrepreneurs; competition is imperfect to the extent that any player can affect the terms of 
any relationship; structural holes theory is a description of the extent to which the social 
structure of a competitive arena creates opportunities for certain players to affect the terms of 
their relationships “ (Burt, 1992, pp.6-7). 
When an actor provides bridges across structural holes (for instance a manager who 
creates interdivisional links in a large organization), combining information from disparate 
groups that would not otherwise communicate, she relocates herself in a “higher–power” 
position. Networks with an architecture characterized by a certain number of actors located in 
bridging nodes across structural holes exhibit a small world structure. A small world structure 
is intermediate between regular (each node with exactly the same number of links) and 
random (as links placed randomly in a graph, nodes have a random number of links). Regular 
and random networks display a low degree of clustering. While this property is evident for 
regular networks, in the case of random networks it is predicted by Erdos and Reny random 
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network theory, one finding of which is that if the network is large, despite the links being 
placed completely at random, almost all nodes will have approximately the same number of 
links. As pointed out by Barabasi (2003, pp.22-23) both of these networks have a very 
democratic nature, i.e. the histogram plotting nodes and associated links follows a Poisson 
distribution, meaning that, for example, in a given society most people have roughly the same 
number of friends and acquaintances. Erdos’ random model dominated research on complex 
network modelling until recent developments made by Watts and Strogatz (1998) on 
clustering. Studying communication and biological network architecture (while trying to 
solve challenging problems on chaos and synchronization) they found that these displayed a 
high clustering coefficient, in contrast with the small one predicted by the random theory. The 
clustering coefficient (with a value ranging between 0 and 1) is obtained by dividing the 
number of actual links between a set of nodes linked to a given node, and the number of 
potential links they could have if they were all linked to each other. If the clustering 
coefficient is zero, then the “central” node is the only element that allows for an (indirect) 
relationship between other nodes. Watts and Strogatz found that the architecture of randomly 
created networks can be depicted as a regular lattice (where each node is connected to its 
immediate and next-nearest neighbours) to which a few extra links are randomly added, 
making the regular turn in a small world network. This finding formalizes Granovetter’s 
model on the role of weak ties in social networks (Granovetter’s society includes many highly 
connected clusters, linked to each other by weak ties, where weak ties correspond to the extra 
link added to the regular network) and offers a general model for the small world 
phenomenon (small world networks can emerge from a minimal random rewiring of a regular 
network). Nevertheless, since it forbids nodes with significantly more links than average, it 
does not account for the actual shape of real social networks. 
As informally introduced by Gladwell’s “tipping point argument” and as formalized by 
Barnabasi’s research into power law, real social networks usually display hubs, i.e. nodes 
with an extraordinarily large number of links. Hubs tell us that in the social and economic 
system, in order to succeed not only does it matter who, as opposed to what you know, but 
that we lack the same opportunities (as in egalitarian random models), with actors in hub 
positions controlling most opportunities. Inequality and power (opportunity) asymmetries are 
ubiquitous in real networks, where the 80/20 rule applies. According to this rule, known also 
as Pareto’s principle (since Pareto observed that 80% of Italy’s land was owned by 20% of the 
population), in a network a few hubs grab most of the links, meaning that in the network the 
degree distribution follows a power law. “While a bell curve has an exponentially decaying 
tail (consistent with the absence of hubs), a power law distribution exhibits a far slower decay 
allowing for “rare events” such as the hubs” (Barnabasi, 2003, p 69). Power laws dominate 
the architectures of complex networks and indicate that these systems, being far from random 
(in physics power laws describe systems in transition from chaos to order), are instead 
governed in their evolution by the law of preferential attachment. Networks with power-law 
degree distribution are referred to as scale-free networks. These networks are the result of a 
growth process guided by the principle of preferential attachment: “in the expanding process 
of real networks, when deciding where to link, new nodes prefer to attach to the more 
connected nodes; thanks to growth and preferential attachment, a few highly connected hubs 
emerge” (Barnabasi, 2003, p.87). 
In economic exchange networks a scale-free structure predicts power whether because hub 
actors (firms) have a negotiating power higher than that of their attached nodes where 
customers and suppliers are located (according to the prediction of power-dependence 
theory), or because they have access to more sources of competitive advantages (according to 
the prediction of structural holes theory). Moreover, in the measure to which hub actors can 
forbid the attachment of given nodes, a strategic use of power can also be assumed. 
 13
Industries characterized by a network form of organization, exhibiting a scale-free 
structure, can be thought of as inherently non-competitive, and should be closely monitored 
by antitrust authorities.  
 
2.4. A general framework from the perspective of the New Institutional Economics 
 
In a sense, New Institutional Economics can be considered as an enlargement of the 
standard model that takes explicitly into account the power issue. The famous Robertson’s 
definition of firms as “islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious cooperation 
like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk”, was used by Coase (1937) to launch 
the question of how is that in capitalist economies firms (and thus power) do substitute the 
market as a means to allocate resources (this issue has been recently addressed by Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). 
When examining the role of firms in economic organization we can think of two aspects: 
1- the internal organizational environment (i.e. authority relations that define employment 
relationships) and 2-the external organizational problem (i.e. the way through which the firm 
exchanges resources with the external environment, as in the case of procurement 
relationships), i.e. the vertical integration issue. The ways in which New Institutional 
Economics addresses the two issues are useful to integrate different approaches in the analysis 
of power in economics. 
Let’s start from the vertical integration problem. 
New Institutional Economics points out that certain characteristics of procurement 
relationship (for instance repeated purchases, with complex contract specification) can lead 
the parties to switch from short-term contracts (spot markets) to long term contracts that entail 
power in terms of Coleman’s voluntary authority disjoint relationships. 
When these contracts are complete and enforceable by a third party, it is even possible, 
according to Coleman, separate the economic realm from the political one because exchange 
of rights can be thought in this case to occur in a competitive market, where, following 
Coleman’s reasoning, the only source of power is “money” (the power-to-act type that is in 
any way in a capitalist economy). It does exist a coercive power, that makes the authority 
relation work, but it resides outsides the exchange relationship, in the state’s legal system, i.e. 
in the political realm. 
On the contrary when long-term contracts are incomplete and not enforceable by a third 
party, power arises in the form foreseen by the contested exchange approach and it is no more 
possible to separate the economic realm from the political realm. The outcome of the 
exchange and its distribution will depend on the behaviour of the more powerful party and 
any grant of equity and efficiency assured by the standard model will vanish. The incomplete 
contract theory of the firm (Hart, 1988; Grossman and Hart, 1986) states that vertical 
integration (and hence the firm) occurs when contracts fail because of their incompleteness, 
then the party more able to exploit the residual claims (the party in the terminology of Crozier 
and Friedberg more “puissance”-endowed, or in the lexicon of Coleman, with more power) 
will acquire the residual rights of control. In the model of Grossman and Hart any process of 
vertical integration entails a redistribution process that will favour the more powerful party, 
with contradictory equity and efficiency effects. This result sharply contrasts with the 
Williamson explanation of vertical integration that accounts for the shift from one 
organizational form (the long-term contract) to another (the firm) exclusively in terms of 
transaction costs minimizing, implying an efficiency improvement. According to Williamson 
(1985) high resource specificity (along with opportunism, bounded rationality and an 
imperfect legal system) turns a competitive relationship into a bilateral monopoly; when the 
bargaining entails unbearable transaction cost, a contractual agreement fails and vertical 
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integration occurs. In this way power is intended only as bargaining power, linked to a lack of 
competition. In other terms while in Williamson’s explanation firms integrate to save on 
transaction costs, the incomplete contract theory of firm claims that firms integrate to exploit 
residual rights of control. What Grossman and Hart fail to underline, is that incomplete long-
term contracts do not necessarily lead to vertical integration (and thus to power in the form of 
voluntary legitimate relations that define firms) or to exchange failure. They can instead 
survive thanks to endogenous enforcement mechanisms (on the type of ‘contingent renewal’ 
suggested by Gintis) that secure the power to the party on the short side of the exchange 
relationship, or thanks to trust-based or power-based self-enforcing agreements. In the case of 
power-based self-enforcing agreement power refers to the capability of one party to 
“informally” enforce the agreement by obtaining obedience by the other party (through 
promise, threat, retaliation, reward, punishment). Source of power is either structural or 
resides in the “power-endowment” (or the “atouts” endowment in the terminology of Crozier, 
Friedberg, 1977) of the powerful actor.  
Let’s turn now to the internal organizational problem. 
Neo-institutionalists are used to thinking of firms as “nexus of contracts”. In this way 
power issues related to the firms’ internal organizational problems take the same form as 
those related to the external organizational problems. Here again contracts defining 
relationship among various members of the organization can be complete and-or enforceable 
by a third party or incomplete and not externally enforceable. In the first case power assumes 
the form of disjoint authority relations (in Coleman’s terminology) whose ex-ante and ex-post 
problems, such as those related to shirking and monitoring can be solved defining the kind of 
incentive contracts that correct adverse selection and moral hazard problems in agency 
models. In the second case the kind of power foreseen by Crozier and Friedberg, that could be 
labelled ‘politically-based power’, must be accounted for. In this latter case self-enforcing or 
self-policing agreements (Furbton and Richter, 2000, p239), are involved. Once again when 
constitutional problems arise (that is the problem of whom to give the power to to enforce 
rights, or, in Coleman’s lexicon, the “choice” of relevant others), economic exchanges, such 
as social exchanges, are supported by political other than economic behaviours. 
Finally it is worth noticing that the neo-institutional approach also offers the possibility to 
confront the organizational role of power and trust. Literature on trust has widely shown how 
trust lowers transaction costs in the system and enhances the general organizational 
efficiency, correcting markets as well as contracts and bureaucracies failures associated with 
opportunistic behaviors. Power also corrects organizational problems, because, as we have 
seen, when incomplete contracts fail, power intervenes and let the transaction work out. 
Nevertheless besides their functional similarity trust and power act very differently in the 
system. While trust promotes equity and fair competition, power promotes inequality and 
unfair competition. While trust is based on cooperative behaviors, power is based on 
extremely competitive behaviors. Furthermore, unlike trust, power produces power at an 
exponential rate of growth, eventually reinforcing its negative effects. Finally, and this is the 
worst, power can destroy trust very easily, while trust hardly can scratch power. An ordered 
society can lie on the absolute coercive power of the Leviatano, and pay the order through 
inequalities, but can also lie on trust and promote equality. Rawls, in his theory of justice, has 
shown that an ordered society grounded on a concept of justice as equality needs a great deal 
of trust to operate and needs to limit the “organizational role” of power. Rawls (1971) 
recognizes that some problems of collective choice indeed take the form of a prisoner 
dilemma game, in the same way as does the problem of the state of nature figured by Hobbes, 
and their solution can be attained only using some form of coercive power. In his research on 
the relationship among collective choice dilemmas, power and economic prosperity Olson 
(2000) comes to the same result.  
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Results attained so far (figure 2 summarizes relationships between power and economic 
organization) allow for the following four general statements on power and economics:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I- A distinction can be made between power-to act and power over. 
II- Standard economics explicitly considers only three kind of power: purchasing power, 
market power and bargaining power. The first is clearly a form of power to act, but is also an 
“atouts” that gives actors the possibility to exert power-over. The second is a form of power 
over. The third is a form of power-over, even if standard economics fails to recognise it, 
because it vaguely defines bargaining power as the share of the surplus that one gains in a 
bargain, rather than to consider the means of attaining it (i.e. through a power-based 
behaviour).  
III- The contested exchange approach clearly indicates contract incompleteness as a 
source of power in the system. 
IV- The new institutional economics implicitly puts the issue of power at the core of the 
organizational problem, demonstrating that, even stemming from a methodological 
individualism approach, and deploying the analytical techniques of the rational choice theory 
in a liberal context (actors act voluntarily), power emerges as a fundamental organizational 
force in capitalistic economic systems. 
 
Self-enforcing agreements 
Spot markets
Firms 
Power-based 
[Purchasing power (power to act)]
High transaction costs 
Contracts 
Complete, enforceable by 
a third party 
[Bargaining power (power over)] 
High transaction costs
[Endogenous enforcement mechanisms (power over) ]   
[Disjoint Authority relations (power over)] 
[Inside influence activities (power over)]
[Outside influence activities (power over)]
[Market power (power over)]
Networks 
[Structurally 
based power 
(over and to act)] 
Incomplete, non enforceable by a 
third party 
[power-over (contested exchange 
approach)] 
Quasi-formal endogenous enforcement 
mechanisms 
[Power over (Crozier 
and Friedberg)] 
Trust-based 
Figure 2. Organizational forms and entailed forms of power. 
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In the presence of positive transaction costs resource allocation can no more be attained 
exclusively through the competitive exchange on spot markets and other organizational forms 
take place, contracts and firms. Complete contracts enforceable by a third party entail power 
in the form of voluntary authority relations. Incomplete contracts not enforceable by a third 
party involves another form of power, stemming either from the use of quasi-formal 
endogenous enforcement mechanisms (as in the case of the contested exchange approach) or 
from informal power-based or trust-based self-enforcing agreements. Firms (vertical 
integration) occur when contract incompleteness is not corrected by power (in either the two 
forms), or alternatively by trust (in the case of trust-based self enforcing agreement). Once the 
exchanges are organized inside the firm, then again power takes the form of Coleman’s 
disjoint authority relations, or, in case of contract incompleteness, the two forms associated 
with endogenous formal and informal enforcement mechanisms; furthermore, market power, 
and power associated with the influence activities inside and outside the organization must be 
considered. To complete the picture I circled the cases of contract incompleteness, jointing the 
circle with a fourth organizational form entering the framework, the network form. This 
means that when in an industry a good deal of incomplete contracts survives, thanks to trust 
or power, networks of manufacturers and suppliers take the place of vertically integrating 
firms. When networks are observed, besides the different forms of power investigated through 
a methodological individualism approach, we must take into account also structurally-based 
forms of power described by structural theories analysed in the third paragraph of this section. 
Concluding, we can add a fifth statement to the four just mentioned: 
V- Although new institutional economics is grounded on the very same epistemological 
assumptions of the standard model, the organizational issues it raises draw a bridge between 
this latter and new theoretical strands of radical economics and economic sociology. In the 
case of power new institutional economics allows also orthodox researchers for a dive into the 
sea of structuralism and of new models of rationality introduced by Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory. 
 
 
3. Power in the food market 
 
It is a fact that currently the agro-food system is widely populated by imperfect markets. 
Figure 2 shows that when the economic system shifts from competitive (i.e. spot markets and 
complete contracts) to imperfectly competitive environments made up of incomplete contracts 
and large firms, power affects the system through a variety of forms beyond the “traditional” 
market and bargaining power forms. Therefore, in studying food system organization, 
whether for descriptive or normative aims, the analysis of power, carried out using the 
different approaches surveyed in the previous sections, should not be neglected. In this 
section I make three examples of power-related issues in the analysis of the food market: 1) 
welfare-assessment of vertical contractual arrangements; 2) the analysis of recent processes of 
networking; 3) the multiform power of large firms and the role of corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
3.1. Welfare assessment of vertical contractual arrangements  
 
New institutional economics gives an efficiency-based explanation of organizational 
dynamics in the economic system. Every time a new hybrid arises moving along the 
continuum of organizational forms that range from spot markets to contracts and hierarchies, 
it entails an efficiency improvement in terms of transaction and/or production cost reduction. 
Using the power argument I stress that a contractual arrangement with a low exchange value 
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can last in the system even when other arrangements exist with a higher exchange value. Let 
us assume a high contractual incompleteness, with transaction costs associated with problems 
of post-contractual enforcement and ex-post incentive alignments. According to the 
Williamsonian view, either a hierarchy emerges (with one party assuming via legitimate 
formal contracts the control of residual claims), or the incomplete contract survives because a 
high level of trust reduces risks of opportunism and reduces monitoring and assurance. On the 
contrary, according to the power argument, the incomplete contract can survive also in 
presence of high transaction costs. That happens when the party on the short side of the 
market (as predicted by the contested exchange approach) or less dependent on the exchange 
(as predicted by the power-dependency theory) ”forces” the other party to bear all monitoring 
and insurance costs. The example in the following box (figure 3) clarifies this point.  
 
Figure 3 - A numerical example 
Let’s assume a transaction between a supplier and a buyer characterized by the following elements: 
1) a minimum quality standard is required; 2) compliance to the standard is supplier’s liability; 3) the 
standard can be attained through the effort of both parties or through the effort of the supplier only; 4) a 
long term procurement contract is subscribed to, with a clause stating the contribution of both parties to 
the standard achievement; this contribution to be called “quality investment”; 5) while supplier quality 
investment is necessary to the achievement of the standard, the lack of buyer quality investment only 
occasionally causes standard violation; 6) buyer quality investment is not observable and not verifiable by 
a third party . 
Let us denote: Cps= Seller production cost, Cpb=buyer production cost, Cqs=seller quality cost, 
Cqb=buyer quality cost, TEV= total exchange value, EVs=seller exchange value, EVb=buyer exchange 
value, S= sanction, P=price on the market (i. e. received by the buyer). Let us assume Cps=3; Cpb=2, 
Cqs=1; Cqb=1; P=16; S=4. 
Depending on the different ways in which parties deal with contract incompleteness, four exchange 
outcomes are possible: 
I A high level of trust exists and therefore the seller does not insure herself against a possible lack of 
buyer quality investment. Parties exhibit equity preference (or they have an equal bargaining power). 
Therefore, parties equitably share the total exchange value. In that case TEV= P-
(Cps+Cpb+Cqs+Cqb=1)=16-(3+2+1+1)=9; EVb=4,5; EVs=4,5. 
II There is lack of trust and power balance and therefore the seller does insure herself (as a 
consequence seller quality cost rises to 3) against a possible lack of buyer quality investment (that implies 
Cqb=0). Parties exhibit equity preference (or they have an equal bargaining power), and therefore, they 
equitably share the total exchange value. In that case TEV=16-(3+2+3+0)=8; EVb=4 EVs=4. 
III There is lack of trust and power imbalance. Buyer has a power advantage (and parties do not 
exhibit equity preference) and therefore has incentive not to fulfil the agreement. The parties unequally 
share total exchange value. In that case TEV=16-(3+2+3+0)=8; EVb=5 EVs=3. 
IV There is lack of trust and power imbalance. Seller has the power to require the buyer to “certify” 
his quality investment (since quality investment is not verifiable by a third party I refer to “indirect” forms 
of certification; for instance seller could require the buyer to make verifiable investments that indirectly 
prove quality investment). As a consequence buyer quality cost goes up to 4. Seller also has the power to 
appropriate a larger share of surplus. In that case: TEV=16-(3+2+1+4)=6; EVb=1 EVs=5. 
Confronting outcomes from cases I and II, it is evident that trust lowers transaction costs due to 
contract incompleteness and enhances total welfare. Cases III and IV show the inefficiency (compared to 
trust) of power as a means to correct incompleteness. They also show that the effects are different 
depending on which party has power advantage. In the example the worst case is the fourth, with the 
lowest value of total exchange and the highest distributive distortion. 
It is worth noticing that with power imbalance of case IV transaction costs due to contract 
incompleteness and lack of trust are higher than in case of power balance (case II), meaning that the 
inefficiency of contract incompleteness is worsened by the exercise of power. In other terms power can 
stick a transaction to an inefficient organizational arrangement. Note also that the weaker party in case IV 
could have an incentive to vertically integrate as long as the cost of integration is less than 8 (8 is the 
difference between the maximum exchange value reported in case I and his share of exchange value when 
seller has the power). Vertical integration in such a case would lower total exchange value, meaning that 
this strategy can be carried out with the aim of countervailing (or exploiting) different forms of power 
(besides the market power generally accounted for), with a negative welfare effect not clearly dealt with 
by traditional related literature.  
 18
 
More generally power argument linked to contract incompleteness helps to explain the 
low level of vertical contractual integration in the food system. Traditionally, the shift from a 
weak contractual relationship to a tight contractual integration is deemed to occur when it can 
lower transaction and /or production costs (for examples those costs associated with a high 
degree of resource specificity or with scope economies) and/or raise market power. Looking 
at the problem in term of power associated with contract incompleteness helps to explain why 
a weak incomplete contract is used even when a tighter contract (it does not matter if more or 
less incomplete) could yield a marketing surplus. This is the case when the pre-existent 
contract is incomplete in a way such that the party with more power (with more atouts) can 
control sources of incertitude in such a way as to raise her own interest. For example, let us be 
the case of a new opportunity to raise the marketing surplus by making investments whose 
specificity needs more contractual integration (this can be the case of a product innovation 
that needs vertically coordinated quality assurance activities). If in the new contract the party 
in high power position in the pre-existent contract cannot get a gain higher than the current 
one, he will not switch to the new contract. Therefore power motivations (other than market 
power) will stick the channel to an inefficient organizational arrangement. 
The policy implication is that to promote the supply chain efficiency it is not always 
appropriate to rely on competition policy and market deregulation. A higher market 
concentration could lead to a better exploitation of market and technological opportunities. 
Moreover appropriate market regulations (intended here in a broad sense as legal enforceable 
constraints that raise the completeness of contracts) could change the “structure” of the 
“contract-game” in a way such as to prevent parties from exerting power, whenever power 
harms more than benefits organizational efficiency. 
The above considerations suggest that difficulties in assessing welfare effects of vertical 
restraints (Dobson and Waterson, 1996) partially arise from the limited attention given to 
power. As argued by Hamilton (2003), vertical restraints, as retail slotting allowances, more 
than being associated with retailers’ market and buying power, seem to be associated with 
various strategic practices carried out by retailers as well as processors in order to raise their 
gain opportunities in a broader way than simply exercising market power. From a power 
perspective we could say that vertical restraints change the size and the distribution of the 
economic surplus by changing the organizational structure of the chain. Specifically, actors 
who promote vertical restraints try to change the institutional framework of the exchange in 
order to increase their “marge de liberté” in exploiting possible sources of rents. 
 
3.2. Understanding recent processes of networking 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s the key players in world economy were large vertically integrated 
transnational corporations (TNCs), whose use and abuse of power has been often deemed to 
jeopardize sovereignty and effectiveness of national governments. In the 1980s and 1990s 
radical changes took place. In this period “the rising integration of world markets through 
trade brought with it a disintegration of the production process of multinational firms, since 
companies found it profitable to outsource (domestically and abroad) an increasing share of 
their non-core manufacturing and service activities” (Gereffi, 2005, p. 166). As a 
consequence, the whole production structure in the global economy changed, with the 
emergence of international trade and production networks. During the last two decades in the 
food sector many TNCs have progressively reduced their involvement in first-tier processing 
and have engaged in policies of outsourcing together with high investments in brand equity. 
Brand and financial management are currently the core activities of these companies and the 
coordination of their suppliers’ networks is central to their corporate strategies. (A good 
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example of this behaviour is the implementation of Project Millennia and Project Excel by 
Heinz in the processing tomato industry – as reported by Pritchard, Burch, 2003). The shift to 
those globally networking is likely to affect at least three general issues: 1- the process of 
industrial upgrading in developing countries, 2- the efficiency of industrial structures, and 3- 
how the new transnational capitalist class will rule the global system. The structurally based 
power argument suggests that distributive and efficiency effects of networking processes will 
depend on network structure and on power imbalances characterizing linkages in networks. 
When network structures shift from regular or random types to scale-free types it is very 
likely that the growing networking process will lead to an exacerbation of disproportion in 
income distribution (both at intra and inter country level), due to the ‘rich get richer’ effect. 
As a result, when a network exhibits a scale-free structure, anticompetitive effects can occur 
(requiring the intervention of antitrust authorities), even in presence of a not excessively high 
concentration index. 
Literature on industrial organization has compared networks to vertical integration as 
alternative supply structures for specialized inputs, where networks turn dedicated into 
flexible assets. The general wisdom is that flexible assets and networks involve social benefits 
when there is high demand uncertainty. When relationships between buyers and suppliers 
entail incomplete long-term contracts, payments are often determined or adjusted ex-post 
through informal contracts. In this case networks’ welfare effects will depend on how the 
exchange surplus in ex-post negotiation is shared among firms in the network. Kranton and 
Minnehart (2000) demonstrate in their model (using game theory) that when the Shapley 
value is used instead of the Nash bargaining solution, players’ investment incentives are no 
more aligned with economic welfare. In terms of power argument this means that when 
relations in networks are affected by power imbalances (considering bargaining as well as 
structurally based power) causes of vertical disintegration do not need to reside in efficiency 
seeking (or “simply” market power enhancing) behaviour.  
 
3.3. The multiform power of large firms  
 
As Coleman’s theory points out, power is a trivial issue only in the case of a perfectly 
competitive market system (where the only power is the purchasing power), otherwise power 
is at the core of the socio-economic organizational puzzle. The fundamental trait of market 
imperfection is not the chance to get positive price-cost margins; instead it is the switching 
from the market institution to the firm institution as a new exchange government form. Firms, 
unlike the ideal economic actors in the walrasian design, besides purchasing power, exert at 
least five other forms of power, as summarised in table 2. While the first form of power 
(authority relations within the firm) can be thought to have positive efficiency effects (it is 
supposed to make the system save on transaction costs), the other four forms are associated 
with monopoly inefficiencies and rising costs, due to influence costs and rent-seeking 
behaviours. Moreover, considering the political activity of firms calls for a deeper attention to 
all the activities they carry out (especially multinational corporations, as recently documented 
by various authors, such as Bakan, 2004; Korten, 2001; Nace, 2003; Rosefield, 2002) by 
persuading, bribing or threatening public regulators in order to obtain “personal” advantages. 
“Power abuse” by firms also includes practices that corporations habitually carry out in order 
to externalise (more or less legally) their costs, thus causing harm to “others” (workers, 
consumers, communities, the environment), and other practices such as unfair presentation of 
financial statements, deceptive advertising, breach of trust and so on. 
The power argument upheld so far leads to at least four basic tenets: 
1-When valuing negative consequences of market imperfections, distortions stemming 
from forms of power other than market power should be seriously taken into account.  
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2-While deregulation policies are generally deemed to improve efficiency by boosting 
private enterprise, they should instead be considered as a way of facilitating firms’ exercise of 
power, with all the possible negative welfare consequences. 
3-More generally, when comparing different institutional frameworks (in order for 
instance to choose the “right” agricultural or food safety policy instrument) power-based 
considerations should “accompany” efficiency-based considerations. 
4-In many cases power abuses by firms cannot be prevented by ad hoc regulation policies 
(when these latter induce excessive distortions of private incentives). In such circumstances, 
the hope for a “better world” eventually resides in corporate social responsibility, and public 
intervention in the socio-cultural sphere can turn out to be much more effective than 
intervention in the economic sphere. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The paper is an attempt to introduce power, as an autonomous analytical dimension, for 
the analysis of food chains and networks. To that aim many theoretical perspectives of the 
study of power have been explored and have been eventually incorporated in a unified 
framework, keeping together standard economics, institutional perspectives, and network and 
managerial sciences. One result is that power is a kind of topic that fits the “encompassing” 
scope and methods quoted in the early research agenda drawn for the chain and network 
science (Omta, Triennekens, Beers, 2001). Another result is that even remaining within the 
standard model, power can successfully enter the research agenda of agricultural economists. 
Nevertheless, best results in the analysis of power could be attained starting from a 
structurally based perspective, especially when dealing with current processes of vertical 
disintegration and networking in the food system. 
While quite successful on a theoretical ground the paper is very incomplete on a more 
empirical ground, giving only a few examples of “real food issues” related to the topic of 
power. This lack is due to the scant available literature. To partially fill the gap between 
theory and practice, it is worth ending the paper with a list of some topics of the current 
research on food chains and networks “sensitive” to the outlined concepts of power: 
transparency, strategic alliance, and global sourcing. 
While transparency is generally deemed to improve food safety and organizational 
efficiency in the supply chain (Hofstede et al., 2005), there is still controversy about 
institutional features able to create and sustain transparency. It has been argued that the more 
intense the division of labor, the more process interdependencies result and the lower 
transparency is (Theuvsen, 2004). The power argument suggests that the more incomplete and 
non enforceable contracts are, the more the relationships must rely either on trust or on power 
to succeed; while trust positively affects transparency, power tends to erode it. 
The raise and fall of strategic alliances are still “obscure” phenomena in business and 
organizational literature. Recently, Kumar and al. (2005), suggested tackling alliances as open 
social systems in order to face their multidimensional and complex features. Power can add 
new insights to this issue at least in three ways: 1-power can be considered as a conflict-
solving means, alternative to trust; 2-the hidden power (Cross, Parker, 2004) of social 
networks linking CEOs and managements of “allied organizations” emerging as a result of 
alliances, can be the ultimate arbiter of alliance fortunes; 3-the parties empowerment of 
structural-based power emerging from the alliance can be the main strategic motivation of the 
agreement. 
Recently, a strain of literature (Feenstra, Hanson, 2005; Antras, Helpman, 2004) has tried 
to tackle the issue of global sourcing by integrating lessons from incomplete contract theory, 
general equilibrium models of international trade, and industrial organization models of 
imperfect competition. While power enters these model only in the form of bargaining models 
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(equilibria are very sensitive to the kind of solutions assumed for the bargaining games at the 
level of buyer-supplier relationship, with the Nash bargaining solution being the favourite to 
allow for analytical tractability) it would be challenging to consider power in the form of 
control asymmetry due to the unequal information and legal enforcement systems among the 
parties, as well as in the structural form emerging as a result of the outsourcing processes, 
with firms that consolidate their hub positions being the ultimate exploiters of outsourcing 
advantages. 
Concluding, the paper has barely touched upon the “hot” issue of power and food system, 
to deal with which a large amount of theoretical and empirical research is required.  
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